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While much has been written about the theory of intentionality that is sketched by Brentano in his
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint of 1874, comparatively little effort has been invested in
Brentano’s other works, in spite of the fact that the Psychology itself reveals new and interesting
perspectives when viewed within the wider corpus of Brentano’s writings. In what follows I shall attempt
to show that interpretations standardly imposed upon Brentano’s text mask the peculiar nature of his
thinking at the time of the Psychology, and that the key to a more correct interpretation can be derived
from an examination of Brentano’s earlier attempts to come to grips with matters of psychology. 
The Psychology of Aristotle (1867)1
The overarching context of all Brentano’s writings is the psychology of Aristotle and the ontology of
material and immaterial substance that goes together therewith. Our present remarks will accordingly
consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically of Aristotle’s conception of the soul, as seen
through Brentano’s eyes. Since we are concerned above all with the question as to how Aristotle was
understood by Brentano, we shall need to consider neither the correctness of Brentano’s interpretation nor
the coherence of the underlying ideas.
The soul is, as Aristotle says, ‘in a way all existing things; for existing things are either sensible
or thinkable, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and sensation is in a way what is sensible’.
(431 b 21) Materia prima can become everything material, and does not exist except as something
material. In an analogous way, the soul can become everything sensible and intelligible, and does not
exist except insofar as it receives the form of something sensible and intelligible. In each case what gets
2. Soul (potential) plus forms (actual) yield the microcosm; matter (potential) plus forms (actual) yield the
macrocosm. Cf. George 1978, p. 254. Brentano was to the end of his life impressed by Aristotle’s doctrine here. (See
e.g. 1933, p. 158, Eng. pp. 119f.; 1976, Part Two, V.)
3. Cf. the discussion of cognition as ‘similarising’ in my “Brentano and Marty” (forthcoming).
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added is of a formal nature, and it is the fixed stock of forms or species which informs both the realm of
thinking and that of extended (material, corporeal) substance. For Aristotle, as for Brentano, these two
realms are, as it were, attuned each to the other. 
Forms or universals exist, accordingly, in two different ways: within the soul, and within
corporeal substance. Within the former they are actual whenever the soul cognises a species. Within the
latter they become actual whenever a thing of a given species comes into existence. Otherwise they are
potential only. Outside the soul, moreover, actualised forms are always and inextricably bound up with
matter.2
Aristotle, one could say, conceived the link between mind and corporeal substance further as a
sort of spiritual nourishment. The sensory and intelligible parts of the soul take in sensory and intelligible
forms, in something like the way in which the body, through the agency of the vegetative soul, takes in
matter in the form of food. The basic psychic processes within, whether sensory or intellectual, result in
an extraction or abstraction of forms from the substances without. ‘By a “sense”,’ Aristotle writes, ‘is
meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter.’ (424 a
18) When the soul is affected by what is corporeal, then it is as if there occurs a transfer of form, so that
agent and patient become to this extent alike.3 Two senses of affecting must however be distinguished. On
the one hand there is affecting in the strict or proper sense, which involves a real alteration of the affected
thing, as when a piece of wax takes on the impress of a seal. On the other hand there is affecting in an
extended or improper sense, which involves no real action on the side of the agent and no real alteration
on the side of the patient, but merely an actualisation in the latter of something that is present there
already in potency. Sensing and thinking are cases of affecting in this second, improper sense.
The piece of wax takes on the form of the seal; but this occurs in a way that is largely indifferent
to the particular metallic constitution of the latter. Similarly, Aristotle says, ‘the sense is affected by what
is coloured or flavoured or sounding, but it is indifferent as to what in each case the substance is’. (424 a
23) The wax, however, acquires a form that is merely like the form of the seal. The sense, in contrast,
4. Otherwise, Aristotle says, it has no nature of its own: ‘that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that
whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing.’ (429 a 22) 
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takes in the very same form as is present in the object sensed. Yet sensing red is different from being red,
just as feeling warmth is different from having warmth in oneself ‘materially’ or ‘physically’. When I am
warm, then I am changed, affected in the proper sense, by the thing that warms me. When I feel warmth,
however – when, in the scholastic terminology, I have warmth in myself not materially but objectively or
as an object – then I am affected only in an extended sense. As Brentano himself puts it:
It is not insofar as we become cold that we sense what is cold; otherwise plants and
inorganic bodies would sense; rather it is only insofar as what is cold exists within us
objectively, i.e. as known, that it is sensed, that is, insofar as we take coldness in, without
ourselves being its physical subject. (Ps.d.A., p. 80, Eng. pp. 54f.; cf. 425 b 20) 
This affecting in the improper sense involves, we said, a mere actualisation of what is already present in
potency. The reference to ‘potency’, here, reflects an attempt on Aristotle’s part to distance himself from
Plato’s view that the soul has within itself the ideas themselves already at birth. For Aristotle, in contrast,
the soul has (or is) merely the power (faculty, Vermögen) of sensing and thinking. It is, so to speak, only
the possibility of the ideas. The intellectual soul is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable. When it is
not thinking, it is at best merely the power or capacity to take on certain forms.4
Everything in external reality, as Aristotle conceives it, both form and matter, both what is
sensible (sensible forms) and what is thinkable (intelligible forms), belongs to ‘sensible spatial
magnitudes’: ‘the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the
states and affections of sensible things.’ (432 a 4) 
The intelligible forms, insofar as they exist outside the soul, are, that is to say, locked away inside
sensible matter. This implies, for Aristotle, that nothing can be thought or learned (no form can be
actualised within the soul) except through the assistance of sense. But if all basic psychic processes are, as
we claimed, processes that result in an extraction (or abstraction) of forms, then it follows that the
intellect is dependent upon some analogue of matter from out of which its intelligible forms can be
extracted. It is our senses which provide this analogue of matter, and thinking is in this sense dependent
on sensing. Sensing leaves traces in the sense organs, traces which constitute a new sort of power or
5. Ps.d.A., p. 146, Eng. p. 96. 
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disposition and which are contrasted with the ‘act’ or ‘making actual’ of sensing and thinking in being not
episodic but enduring. 
Such traces, now, are able to become once more actualised. They can be stimulated through other
sensory presentations in such a way that the earlier sensible form returns to sense as an ‘image’ or
‘phantasm’. Whatever appears in imagination was earlier, if in different connections, taken in through
sense perception.
Thinking, now, relates to such images or phantasms as sensing relates to the external sensible
things:
Sense receives its images, in that it turns to the external objects; the intellect receives its
ideas by gazing, as it were, upon images; and just as seeing and hearing are no longer
possible when the seen or heard object disappears ..., so thinking is no longer possible
when the appropriate images are no longer present in the senses. As sensation is a kind of
passion or being affected by what is sensory, so thinking is a kind of passion or being
affected by what is intelligible, and what is intelligible is ..., as Aristotle says, in the
sensory presentations.5
It is in terms of this idea that knowledge itself may come to be understood as a lasting endowment of the
soul. Just as actual sensing leaves traces which make possible the actual having of images, so actual
thinking leaves traces (what we call ‘knowledge’ or ‘learning’), which become actualised in subsequent
active thinking. 
The fact that, as Aristotle puts it, ‘there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible
spatial magnitudes’ (432 a 3) has far-reaching ontological consequences. The world, we might say, is
made up of realia and non-realia: the proper objects of sensing and thinking, respectively. These do not,
however, as on Plato’s view, constitute two distinct realms of objects. Non-realia (forms or universals)
exist only as immanent to realia, exist only in something else, either in what is mental or in what is
material. Normally, as we have seen, non-realia exist only as bound up with matter and their existence as
non-realia is then potential only. Sometimes however non-realia exist as non-realia actually, namely in the
5mind. For thinking is the actualisation of forms as such. And when the mind is actively thinking, then it is
the universals which it thinks. 
Actualisation is in a certain sense a separation. Again, however, it is not a real separation, but a
separation in an improper or extended sense: ‘when thinking the objects of mathematics, the mind thinks
as separate elements which do not in fact exist in separation.’ (431 b 17) As existing in the thing, forms or
universals are tied to matter in what we might conceive as a sort of mutual pervasion. They may,
however, exist also as freed or separated, and this either in a proper or in an improper sense. As actualised
in sensation, they are separated only in an improper sense from their material complements and thus are
still individuated thereby. The resultant actualised universals (the warmth of this fire, the redness of this
rose) are still founded on their respective matters, are still experienced as in the respective things. As
actualised in thought, on the other hand, universals are freed from their material complements in a double
sense: they are separated and independent. Where sensation apprehends what is external and individual,
knowledge apprehends free universals, and the latter exist entirely within the orbit of the soul. ‘That is
why a man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon himself –
a sensible object must be there.’ (417 b 24) 
But how, more precisely, are we to understand this talk of ‘free’ and ‘bound’ universals? When I
see a red object, then I see something that is composed of matter and form. What I take in is the form
alone, but it is in fact still connected to (and thus individuated by) its matter. What I know intellectually,
on the other hand, is not the object, nor what is individuated by the object, but the form itself, for example
the redness. One must not, however, conclude that what is taken in by sense, and what is taken in by the
intellect, relate to each other as numerically different objects. The view of Aristotle and Brentano is that
they differ not as one thing from another thing, but as one thing from itself when it stands or behaves or is
connected or situated differently (for example when a stick is pulled straight after having been bent). 
Plato held that we know flesh and the being of flesh in that we take into ourselves two
different things, indeed two things which are separated from each other in their
substances, for the idea is for him a thing for itself and subsists in separation from what is
material. (Ps.d.A., p. 133, Eng. p. 86)
6For Aristotle, in contrast, the flesh which is grasped by the senses, and the being of this flesh, which is
grasped by the intellect, are not merely one insofar as they are both in one body; they are essentially
identical. The same thing is taken up in the sensory and in the intellective soul, but in a different
condition: in the one case it is still tied to its matter; in the other case it is abstract, a free universal. But
the universal that is here free is still the same universal as is there bound. When the universal flesh is
taken up into the intellect, it is ‘the same sensory-corporeal flesh which is in the senses, but the condition
is different in which it is in the one or in the other faculty.’ (Ps.d.A., p. 134, Eng. p. 87) 
The job of the scientist is, after all, to get to know the crystals and plants and other bodies which
he finds here on Earth. Thus, ‘if the intellect knows the being of flesh, then it is not something other and
immaterial that is taken into him, but the very same object that is in the senses; only, in the intellect it is
abstract, in sense concrete with individual matter.’ (Ps.d.A., p. 135, Eng. p. 88) A line which was bent is,
after having been made straight, 
still the line which it was, only it is other, it has become simpler; and so the corporeal
object that was in the senses is also in the intellect still one and the same, only its
condition is different. Like the line, it has become simpler, its individual differences have
been evened out. (Ps.d.A., p. 135, Eng. p. 88) 
Even in the case of mathematical concepts, the intellect does not grasp something more immaterial than
what is grasped by sense: it does not take into itself something incorporeal or non-sensory. For the very
same thing that is in the intellect is also in the senses, merely, as Brentano puts it, in anderer und anderer
Weise sich verhaltend. 
Forms or concepts, then, exist originally as parts (in an extended sense) of external objects. The
mathematical concept of a curve is already in my sensory presentation of a snub-nosed thing.
Mathematical concepts do not exist outside the mind in separation from sensory bodies. They are in them,
as also are the physical concepts. The intellect therefore knows, when it grasps mathematical concepts,
not something that is separate from sensible matter: ‘it only knows in a separated way something not
separated therefrom.’ (Ps.d.A., p. 150, Eng. p. 98) The corporeal thing itself remains something material
when it is taken up into the intellect; but it is in the intellect in an immaterial way. Outside the intellect a
thing is individually determined; for after all something general without its individual difference cannot
6. Brentano initially goes along with Aristotle here, and in his later works he even generalises Aristotle’s view, for
example by admitting as non-sensible substances also topoids of four and more dimensions. However he insists at
the same time that we can have no positive knowledge of such topoids (just as, for the later Brentano, we can have
no positive knowledge of the soul).
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exist. But in the intellect it has lost its individual determinateness. The broken line has been pulled
straight, ‘and in this state, alien to its original state, what is bodily can now also be in the intellect.’
(Ps.d.A., p. 138, Eng. p. 90) But even in the intellect what is bodily retains forms pertaining to what is
material; only such things as are free of matter in and of themselves could be free of materiality in the
intellect. 
Only one sort of essence is, as far as Aristotle is concerned, of itself free of materiality in this
sense and therefore also supersensory: the essence mind or intellect. Of this essence, and of the concepts
abstracted therefrom, we can have knowledge other than via sensory images.6 The intellect is graspable
just as it is; echoing Averroes, we can say that its last individuating difference is also its last specific
difference. The general concept we have of our mind or intellect is also an individual consciousness of
self. The essence mind or intellect, then, is a heccaeitas, a form that is both intelligible and individuating.
And something similar presumably holds of the essence God.
Mind or intellect is, as Brentano puts it, ‘completely and with the highest intelligibility
completely intelligible’. (Ps.d.A., p. 136, Eng. p. 90) Psychology, accordingly, enjoys a peculiarly noble
status within the system of the sciences. Corporeal things, in contrast, 
allow only an indefinite general knowledge and are not knowable equally in all their
determinations. We know them the more certainly and the more clearly and thus have
them in us the more intelligibly, the more they have become alienated through abstraction
from their natural mode of existence. This is why mathematics is more intelligible than
physics, and why metaphysics is more intelligible than mathematics; also the more
general physical concept is more intelligible than the more special, the genus more than
the species, and the higher genus more than the lower. (Ps.d.A., p. 136, Eng. p. 90)
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874)
7. P.E.S., p. 124n, Eng. p. 88n. 
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Sensing and thinking, for a (Brentanian sort of) Aristotelian, is accordingly a form of taking in. And it
will by now, I hope, be clear how one has properly to interpret Brentano’s thesis in the Psychology from
an Empirical Standpoint to the effect that ‘Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object’. (P.E.S., p. 124,
Eng. p. 88) As Brentano himself puts it in the very next sentence: ‘Every mental phenomenon includes
something as object within itself’. This thesis is, I suggest, to be taken literally – against the grain of a
seemingly unshakable tendency to twist Brentano’s words at this point, a tendency manifested most
recently in Dummett’s book on the Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Brentano’s ‘most familiar positive
thesis’, Dummett tells us – the thesis that acts of consciousness are characterised by their intentionality –
consists in the claim that all such acts are ‘directed towards external objects’. Indeed, the object of a
mental act is, for Brentano, ‘external in the full sense of being part of the objective world independent of
the subject, rather than a constituent of his consciousness.’ (Dummett, p. 39) This interpretation, apart
from making of Brentano’s thesis something self-evidently false, is also quite simply incompatible with
Brentano’s text. Indeed one will find no coherent interpretation of the principle of intentionality so long
as one remains within the framework of our usual, commonsensical notions of both the mind and its
objects. This is not only because Brentano’s principle operates with quite special, Aristotelian notions. It
is also, I suggest, because Brentano’s very formulation of the principle was a response to a hidden
incoherence in these commonsensical notions.
Brentano in fact appends a footnote to the intentionality passage in the Psychology to the effect
that
Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that
the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed
object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect.7
And he goes on to remark that ‘St. Augustine in his doctrine of the Verbum mentis and of its inner origin
touches upon the same fact.’ 
8. Cf. Münch (forthcoming).
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In this light it is clear that Rolf George has hit the nail on the head when he points out that it is in
the context of Brentano’s discussion of two ways of taking in (corresponding to the two senses of ‘being
affected’) in the Psychology of Aristotle that 
the notion of intentional inexistence ... occurs for the first time in Brentano’s writing. It is
not yet used as a criterion for psychical phenomena, nor does he emphasize or perhaps
even notice that one can here speak of an intentional relation. He prefers to follow
Aristotle’s terminology, saying that the intellect (or the organ of sense) is what it thinks
(or senses). The relational mode of expression is eschewed in favour of qualified
predication: ‘is-physically’, ‘is-objectively’. (George 1978, pp. 252f.)
It is not only classical sources which spark Brentano’s immanentistic views however. Brentano
had been impressed also by Comte’s critique of the metaphysics of transcendent substance and had
sought, like Comte, a science of the ‘phenomena’ or ‘Erscheinungen’. 8 He had been impressed also by
corpuscular theories of the physical world and of sensation, theories which imply that what is in the act of
sensation as object bears no similarity to the putative outer world by which, as we commonsensically
suppose, sensation is caused. Brentano wanted to give a true description of what is involved in mental
directedness, not a merely commonsensical one (which for him would be simply one that is based on a
certain sort of prejudice). Colours and so on do not exist in the way we commonsensically suppose. They
are something like secondary qualities as described by Locke, in the sense that they are contributed by the
mind and are such that their being is exhausted by their being in the mind. From this it follows of
necessity that we can have no presentation of the world as it really is in the sense of a world transcendent
to the mind. Certainly we may assume that there are physical objects which cause our sensations. But as
Philipse has rightly pointed out: 
the idea of their existence is doomed forever to be a hypothesis for us (or a metaphysical
assumption, as Brentano says), for physical objects can never be the ‘direct objects’ of
sense perception. (Philipse 1986/87, p. 298)
9. Note, however, that it does not follow from this that outer presentation is untrustworthy; for trustworthiness as an
issue arises only when to presentation there is added judgment, which ascribes existence to the object of
presentation.
10. See his 1925, esp. Part I, dated 1903, which is entitled “Down With Prejudices!”.
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From this it follows, too, that the judgments involved in outer perception are always false. Only inner
perception is a Wahr-nehmung.9 
Philipse goes too far, however, in assuming that the being of immanent objects of ‘outer sense’ is
no sort of being at all, that Brentano is simply employing a certain façon de parler in his talk of
‘immanent existence’. Philipse, too, has allowed himself to be misled in his interpretation of Brentano by
alien (commonsensical) considerations, since at the time of the Psychology Brentano affirms explicitly
that physical phenomena like experienced colours and sounds exist in the mind as parts of consciousness
and that the intentionality of outer perception is therefore a relation between two mental entities, the act
of sensation and the quality sensed. Brentano, it is true, accepts a version of corpuscularism. But he wants
also to maintain the conviction that experienced sounds and colours have a diminished sort of existence,
an existence ‘in the mind’. As we have seen, they are not real, but this does not mean that they are merely
nothing. Rather, they are non-real parts of a real substance, a thinker,
Now there are, it has to be admitted, similarities between Brentano’s doctrine as set out above and
that of Kant. These similarities are however superficial only. Thus where for Brentano the link between
inner activity and putative outer world is constituted by mere (simple and honest) hypotheses, Kant calls
in aid synthetic a priori forms or categories which come down in the end – or so Brentano argues – to
nothing more than prejudices.10 Moreover where Brentano is admirably clear about the opposition
between act and (immanent) object – his doctrine of intentionality is, in the end, nothing other than an
account of the relation between these two – Kant is in this respect still subject to just those unclarities
which had characterised the thinking of the British empiricists.
11. Aristotle himself offers in different contexts different sorts of partition: metaphysical, functional, logical, ethical,
and so on, though it would be unreasonable to see in this any conflict with Brentano’s views (pace Ando 1965, pp.
91, 97).
12. Thus Brentano, commenting on the just-quoted passage in Ps.d.A., writes similarly: 
far from it being possible to assume e.g. a plurality of souls in man which are bound into a certain
unity as a result of their domicile in the same body. Rather, we must say that it is the human soul
which gives unity to the parts of the body (pp. 54f., Eng. p. 36f.).
This makes explicable why ‘it is always only bodies of a certain constitution which have a soul ... [for] it is the soul
itself which determines the essence of its body’ (Ps.d.A., p. 47, Eng. p. 32).
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The Unity of the Soul
A literal reading of Brentano’s thesis to the effect that every mental phenomena includes within itself
something as object will help us to understand Brentano’s deliberations on the unity of the soul in Book II
of the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Here, too, Brentano is inspired by Aristotle. For while
Aristotle recognises that the soul has different kinds of parts11 – above all, it has a sensitive part and an
intellective part – he recognises also that it is none the less a unity. Even though the soul is divisible in the
sense that one part thinks, another desires, still, there must be something that holds these parts together.
But what can this be?
Surely not the body; on the contrary, it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body
together; at any rate, when the soul departs, the body disintegrates and decays. If, then,
there is something else which makes the soul one, this unifying agency would have the
best right to the name of soul, and we shall have to repeat for it the question: Is it one or
multipartite? If it is one, why not at once admit that ‘the soul’ is one? And if it has parts,
then once more the question must be put: What holds its parts together? And so ad
infinitum. (411 b 8)
Brentano, too, accepts a version of this argument. And he, too, faces the problem of reconciling the
complexity of consciousness with what he sees as its necessary unity.12 That the activities of mind are
always manifold and complex is clear. But this, Brentano insists, should not mislead us into supposing
that such activities constitute a mere plurality or heap – as is assumed by those who defend a ‘bundle’
theory of the mind of the Humean sort. Rather, Brentano insists, it is a quite special sort of unity which
marks conscious experience in every instant, however complex such experience might be. Here two sorts
of complexity must be distinguished, with correspondingly different sorts of unifying mechanism. First, is
13. P.E.S., p. 224, Eng. p. 158, which however has ‘partial’ for ‘einseitig’.
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the sort of complexity which arises where a number of psychic activities, for example presenting, judging
and desiring, are directed towards a single object. Second, is that sort of complexity which arises where a
number of psychic acts, directed toward distinct objects, occur simultaneously within a single
consciousness. Both of these two sorts of complexity involve a certain sort of independence: in the one
case, as Brentano says, we have a one-sided, in the other a mutual, independence.13 But neither, Brentano
argues, leads to any breaking up of the real unity in which they are involved. If, then, as Brentano argues,
these are the only ways in which complexification can occur (the only ways in which we can build up
more complex experiences out of simple parts), then it will follow that no matter how complex a given
experience is, its unity will be unaffected.
That unity obtains in the first sort of case turns precisely on the fact that presentation, judging and
desiring share a common object. This common object of presentation constitutes as it were an axis around
which the acts of judging and desiring turn, and must necessarily turn, for it is in every case presentation
that provides such acts with their objects. Clearly however the presence of a common object can serve to
unify experiences in this way only if the object is immanent to those experiences. If Jules and Jim in some
sense share an object, then this can by no means serve to unify their acts into a single consciousness. And
if two experiences of mine are such as to be directed toward what is merely per accidens a single object
(as when I see my neighbour and think about the murderer, in ignorance of the fact that they are one and
the same), then this is clearly insufficient to guarantee that these experiences belong to the framework of a
single consciousness. Rather, presentation, judgment and desire are unified because the very same object
that is immanent to an act of presentation is affirmed or judged to exist in an act of judgment and valued
positively in an act of desire. 
That unity obtains in the second sort of case is seen in the fact that, though the objects of the
respective acts are not identical, they are still in a very strong sense comparable. This comparability is not
merely accidental; it does not rest for example on any contingent side-by-sideness or accessibility of the
objects concerned, for the act of comparison can take place in every case automatically and without
further ado. A man can exercise such knowledge when he wishes, where a comparisons of the more usual
sort does not depend upon himself alone – the objects of comparison must first be sought after. Thus I can
14. Consider also the making of complex plans, engaging in complex processes of deliberation, and so on. If the acts
in such processes were mere parts of a plurality, then the given phenomena would be rendered inexplicable. (P.E.S.,
p. 227, Eng. p. 159.)
15. P.E.S., p. 221, Eng. p. 155. The term ‘partial phenomenon’ is taken from Stumpf 1873. 
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for example apprehend automatically that what I now see and what I now hear (the objects currently
presented to me in these experiences) are non-identical, and again: this is conceivable only if the objects
here are immanent to the act. Their necessary comparability is all of a piece with the necessary
comparability of the relevant acts themselves. When, for example, I simultaneously see and hear, then I
grasp this simultaneity immediately and automatically, in a way which would be impossible if the two
acts constituted a mere plurality.14 
How, now, is this peculiar unity of consciousness to be understood from the ontological point of
view? Conscious phenomena, we can provisionally affirm, are mere ‘divisives’ or ‘partial phenomena’.15
A divisive is, simply, an entity that is not an entity in and of itself, but only as part of something else. A
divisive is, we might say, the result of an abstract division of a whole, i.e. of a division ‘in the improper
sense’ that is not in fact carried out. (Recall our treatment of ‘separation in an improper sense’ above.) A
collective, similarly, is the result of an abstract or improper unification into a whole; and the early
Brentano follows Aristotle in the thesis that a real thing and a collective of real things in this sense are
never identical. Certainly a collective may become a thing (for example when one thing digests another);
but then where there had been parts of a collective are now merely divisives. Similarly, a thing may
become a collective through real division or dissolution or parturition; but then where there had been
mere divisives within a thing are now things in their own right. The latter take the place of the former. 
Divisives are distinguishable as it were abstractly in the thing of which they are divisives. And it
is this common belongingness to a single actual thing of the results of merely abstract division that
constitutes the unity of consciousness in Brentano’s eyes. The case of simultaneous seeing and hearing
shows that we may have a single actual consciousness whose divisives can in principle come to be really
separated from each other in the sense that either can continue to exist when the other has ceased. But
such mutual separability does not affect the unity of the original whole. This Brentano shows by means of
a thought-experiment resting on the supposition that there are physical atoms (entities with no really
separable parts) and that these atoms have some finite extension. Within such atoms we can distinguish
14
‘quantitative parts’: for example, any pair of hemispheres. Each atom comprehends such quantitative
parts as divisives. But it comprehends as divisives also certain individual properties. Many of these, too,
may be incapable of being lost. This may hold of the atom’s individual shape, for example.
Yet of others clearly this does not hold, although they themselves are not to be regarded
as things. The atom goes, for example, from rest to motion and from motion to rest. Yet
notwithstanding this, the motion which obtains in the thing is not itself a thing, otherwise
it would be conceivable that it should survive in separation from the atom. (P.E.S., p.
230, Eng. p. 162, trans. amended)
One is able to imagine here a plurality of parts which belong to a single actual thing in such a way that
there obtain between these parts more and less intrinsic relations. This does not however mean that any of
the given parts could exist outside the context of the given whole. For a motion and a rest are always
individual properties of and distinguishable only in some specific individual thing. The thing can be
separated e.g. from the motion (by being brought to rest). But the motion cannot be separated from the
thing. And what holds of motion and rest holds of shape and colour, too.
So it is also, Brentano now argues, in the case of psychic acts and states. The relation of hearing
to seeing is less intrinsic than, say, that between desire and presentation. But one cannot derive from this
any argument against their belonging to a single real unity, any more than in relation to, say, the motion
and temperature of the atom. To affirm the unity of consciousness is to affirm only that all the psychic
phenomena that we experience, however different they may be, constitute merely partial phenomena
within the framework of a single whole. Hence unity is guaranteed not by the presence of some extra
unifying element: Brentano is at the time of the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in fact
sceptical of any such substantial ‘carrier’ or supporting substratum, just as he is sceptical of atomism as
regards the outer world. His view at this stage is indeed consistent both with the idea that ‘different
groups of psychical phenomena’ could be bound up with a continuous corporeal mass – as in the case of
corals – and with a view of souls as being governed by other souls in a complex hierarchy along the lines
of Leibniz’s monadology. 
It is further possible that a single presentation (for example of a landscape) should manifest some
analogue of spatial extension, as it is possible that different presentations should exist side-by-side in a
quasi-spatial way. There are, however, restrictions on the extent to which we can think the psychic
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activities which belong to the unity of a single consciousness as quantitatively distributed in this sort of
way. It is above all ‘not possible that in one quantitative part seeing should be found, in another the inner
presentation directed thereto or the perception of or the pleasure in the seeing.’ (P.E.S., pp. 235f., Eng.
pp. 165f.) 
Brentano’s view would even be consistent with the possibility that one consciousness might come
to be split into two, for example as a result of certain sorts of surgical operations. For the fact that there
are two or more souls, in whatever relation, does not prove that any single soul might fail to form a unity
(P.E.S., pp. 232f., Eng. p. 164). Thus it is clear that the unity of consciousness in which Brentano is
interested is synchronic only: he is concerned only with unity at a time. Certainly it is true that, ‘as inner
perception shows us only one really unified group of psychical phenomena, so memory shows us directly
not more than one such group for every moment of the past.’ (P.E.S., p. 237, Eng. p. 167) That memory
shows us always such unified groups is something that we know, Brentano claims, with evidence. But it
is not evident that this succession of ‘groups’ – and Brentano’s repeated use of this word in the present
context is significant – must have been part of the same unitary thing as that which comprehends our
present psychic appearances.
Certainly it is not to be denied that, leaving aside occasional gaps, memory shows us a
continuum, a temporally progressing series of groups, between the successive phases of which there
typically obtains a certain similarity. This makes it understandable that we tend to suppose that it is the
same real unity which comprehends all the successive groups of appearances and brings about their
similarity. But we cannot affirm this with evidence, as we can, for example, affirm with evidence that our
present memories belong to the same real unity as our other present psychic acts, our evidence here
resting on the immediate and automatic comparability discussed above. 
Indeed, because in relation to any putative diachronic identity of or involving unified groups,
evidence is unavailable, Brentano at the time of his Psychology sees it as ‘an open question whether the
perseverance of the ego is the survival of one and the same unitary thing or the succession of different
things, of which the one would connect itself to the other and as it were take its place.’ (P.E.S., p. 239,
Eng. p. 168) The self might even be a special bodily organ, and the stuff of this organ be continuously
renewed, so that the unity of consciousness would be, as Brentano says, ‘like that of a river.’ 
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Descriptive Psychology (1889/90)
As his rather loose talk of ‘groups’ of psychic phenomena makes clear, Brentano is at the time of the
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in possession of little more than the germ of an ontological
theory of the different types of parts of consciousness and of the ways in which these join to form a unity.
Certainly he has seen that there are certain sorts of entities – ‘divisives’ or ‘partial phenomena’ – which
can exist only within the context of a certain sort of whole. But he does not, at this stage, recognise the
possibility of extending this insight to yield a general account of the types of parts and of the relations
between them. That is, he does not see the possibility of transforming the material ontology of the parts of
consciousness, a theory constructed for specifically psychological purposes, into a formal ontology of the
types of parts and of unity in general. By the time of his lectures on descriptive psychology given in
Vienna University in 1889/90, however, such a formal ontological theory of parts and of unity has been
developed. Indeed descriptive psychology as Brentano here understands it seems precisely to consist in a
psychology that will issue in an ontologically sophisticated theory of different types of parts of such a sort
that the specification of parts will be at the same time a specification of the ways in which these parts are
fitted together into wholes. As Brentano himself puts it, he seeks to construct a psychological
characteristica universalis, whose letters and words would reflect the different mental constituents or
elements, and whose syntax would reflect the relations between these constituents in larger complex
wholes. Brentano has, in other words, the goal of providing an instrument which will enable the mapping
of instantaneous cross-sections through the territory of the mind, of providing snapshots, as it were, of the
different parts of some individual consciousness at some given time. And his ideas here can be seen to
stand at the beginning of a tradition which results inter alia in Husserl’s development of the formal
ontology of parts and wholes in the Logical Investigations, in the Graz and Berlin schools of Gestalt
psychology, and in Les’niewskian mereology and categorial grammar. 
For our present purposes, however, it is important only to note that in the Descriptive Psychology,
too – which is to say in a context where Brentano sought to develop explicitly and in detail the ontology
underlying the ideas on intentionality presented in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint – there
prevails a resolutely immanentistic view of the objects of our mental acts. 
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Of course even if all of the above is granted, the problem still remains as to how mental acts are
able, on occasions, to achieve a directedness to transcendent objects in the world. And the fruitfulness of
Brentano’s philosophy shows itself not least in the ways in which it led his students and disciples to try
out new and interesting solutions to this problem. The latter should not, however, be allowed to lead us
astray when we are engaged in the task of working out the nature of Brentano’s own original
achievement.
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